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TRUSTEE INVESTMENT POWERS: IMPRUDENT
APPLICATION OF THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
I. Introduction'
The importance of the modem private trust is beyond dispute. The value
of assets held in simple trusts alone amounts to many billions of dollars. Char-
itable, pension, and profit sharing trusts account for many billions more.2 The
decisions made by trustees holding these funds in trust portfolios are naturally
subject to legal constraints. This note will evaluate one constraint, the prudent
man rule, in light of modem capital market theory.
First, the current interpretation of the prudent man rule will be analyzed.
Second, utilizing modem capital market theory, it will be shown that the in-
vestment field has changed so rapidly that it has left its legal restraints behind.
Presently, the prudent man rule actually prevents the trustee from acting
prudently in many circumstances. Finally, solutions will be proposed to remedy
the gap between the present scope of administrative powers and the requirements
of the investor under present economic conditions. Given the magnitude of trust
investments, this analysis is of direct concern to both economists and lawmakers.
II. The Prudent Man Rule: Prevailing Wisdom
A. Rationale Behind the Rule
The law of trusts seeks to provide legal guidelines to govern trust policy,
particularly when the settlor has not done so himself.3 When a trust instrument
does not define the trustee's investment powers, the law provides definitions by
supplying guidelines which create a standard against which the trustee's per-
formance will be measured. By applying certain guidelines in every instrument
where the settlor is silent,- transaction costs5 are reduced. One such guideline
is the prudent man rule.6
B. The Development of the Rule
The prudent man rule originated, practically speaking, in the 1830 case of
1 This note is limited to the analysis of the prudent man rule of trustee investment powers
with regard to investments in organized securities markets.
2 See generally J. COHEN & E. ZINBARG, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS & PORTFOLIO MANAGE-
MENT 662-731 (1970), P. HARERECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER (1959).
3 Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 551 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Friedman].
4 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW at 195 (1973) [hereinafter cited as POSNER].
5 Transaction costs are costs involved in effectuating any transfer of rights or duties among
parties. The price system does not operate without costs, e.g., brokerage costs. See Coase, The
Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
6 The alternative, the legal list approach, confines permissible trust investments to those
listed either by the legislature or courts. This approach is no longer followed by the majority
and will not be dealt with in this note. For the development of the legal list approach and
its subsequent demise see Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary
Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIo ST. L.J. 491 (1951).
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Harvard College v. Amory.' The remaindermen of a trust brought suit alleging
impermissible investment of the corpus in corporate stock which had declined in
value. Upholding the investment, Justice Putnam stated:
All that can be required of a trustee, is that he shall conduct himself faith-
fully and exercise sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence,
discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to specu-
lation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested."
The rule thus imposes three duties on the trustee. First, he must exercise care in
the selection of investments. Second, he must exercise skill in making the selec-
tion. Finally, he must exercise the caution that a reasonable trustee would exer-
cise.9
When announced in 1830, this standard was in sharp contrast to the then
prevailing English emphasis on conservation of principle." Before the Harvard
College rule was glossed by subsequent decisions, it provided for great flexibility
in the administration of trusts." Rather than drawing rigid distinctions between
categories of "proper" and "improper" investments as was done later, 2 the
trustee was given wide latitude to exercise his judgment when making invest-
ment decisions.
Before long the prudent man rule was burdened with detailed restrictions.
Some courts, holding that a particular investment was improper, did so as a
matter of law.' Other courts concluded that a particular investment decision
was improper in a particular time and place and created rules which they re-
garded as universal in their application.' 4 As the common law verified, two
different approaches developed: a legal list rule and a modified prudent man
rule.
The development of the modified prudent man rule over the last century 5
resulted in a distinction between speculative securities," which were not proper
investments for a trustee, and investment securities 7 in which investment was
7 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
8 Id. at 461. See also In Re Cook's Trust Estate, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 125, 171 A. 730
(1934); Marshall v. Frazier, 159 Ore. 491, 80 P.2d 42 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
9 Campbell v. Albers, 313 Ill. App. 152, 39 N.E.2d 672 (1942) ; In Re Walsh's Estate, 171
Misc. 231, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 298 (1939); 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 247 (1965); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRuSTEES, (2d ed. 1960) Chapter 26.
10 3 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 227 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as SCOTT].
11 "It is susceptible of being adapted to whatever conditions may arise in the evolution of
society and the progress of civilization." Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 331, 123 N.E.
665, 666 (1919).
12 "Do what you will; the capital is at hazard." Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9
Pick.) 446 at 460.
13 SCOTT, note 10 supra, § 227.
14 Id.
15 See Shattuck, The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments, 25 B.UT.L. REv.
307, 319-47 (1945); Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary
Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 491-96
(1951).
16 Speculative securities carry a high risk of capital loss and are purchased primarily for
short-term profit.




proper. Kimball v. Reding is an early case making this distinction. The New
Hampshire court held that an investment in shares of stock in a contemplated
railroad was speculative and improper unless authorized by the terms of the trust.
In adapting this rule against speculative investments, the New Hampshire court
narrowed the standard of prudence set forth in Harvard College and trustee in-
vestment powers suffered a corresponding diminution.
Many states followed the lead of Kimball v. Reding, holding that certain
types of investments are proper and others are "forbidden fruit." Among the
"forbidden fruit" were included: securities in new and untried enterprises,19
shares in a speculative corporation," bonds selling at a large discount due to un-
certainty of payment at maturity,2 and the purchase of securities on margin or
the "selling short" of a security.22 A trustee had not performed his duty merely
by avoiding "forbidden fruit"; he was also required to use care, skill, and cau-
tion in selecting any particular investment.23
Prior to making even a permissible investment, it is the duty of the trustee
to use reasonable care in determining the safety of the investment and the prob-
able income it will yield.2" This typically involves securing information from
sources on which prudent men in the community rely.' Having made the in-
vestigation, the trustee is under a duty to exercise a reasonable degree of skill in
selecting an investment.28 In reaching this decision, the trustee must act with
caution not only of a prudent man, but of a prudent man whose primary concern
is the preservation of the funds invested and the income to be derived from the
investment2
Thus the modified prudent man rule imposes two restrictions on the
trustee.28 First, the investment must be of a type which trustees can properly
make. In many states this requirement has crystallized into holdings that certain
types of investments are proper and others improper. Second, if it is an invest-
ment of that type, the particular investment must be proper. The investment is
proper if at the time it was made the trustee exercised care, skill, and caution in
the selection of that investment.
Because of the detailed restrictions inherent in the modified prudent man
18 31 N.L 352, 64 Am. Dec. 333 (1885).
19 See, e.g., In Re Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890) (stock in a new railroad
,company); In Re McDowell, 102 Misc. 275, 169 N.Y.S. 853 (1918), (bonds of companies
engaged in new ventures).
20 See, e.g., In Re Cady's Estate, 211 App. Div. 373. 207 N.Y.S. 385 (1925) (oil stocks);
St. Germaines v. Tuttle, 114 Vt. 263, 44 A.2d 137 (1945) (shares of a corporation heavily
indebted, which had not declared a dividend in two years and whose business was declining).
21 In Re Kohns' Estate, 158 Misc. 853, 286 N.Y.S. 930 (1936).
22 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bacock, 247 F. Supp. 373(S.D. Tex. 1965).
23 Campbell v. Albers, 313 Ill. App. 152, 39 N.E.2d 672 (1942); Delafield v. Barret, 270
N.Y. 43, 200 N.E. 67 (1936). See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, comment
(m) for a listing of factors which a trustee should consider when choosing among authorized
investments.
24 SCOTT, note 10 supra, § 227.1, RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, comment
(b). See also Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N.J. Eq. 617 (1883).
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 comment (b).
26 ScoTT, note 10 supra, § 227.2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, comment
(C).27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, comment (e). See also In Re Ebert, 136
N.J. Eq. 123, 40 A.2d 805 (1945).
28 See SCOTT, note 10 supra, § 227.
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rule, much of the flexibility of the Harvard College approach has been lost. This
loss of flexibility has handicapped trustees who must make effective investment
decisions under current economic conditions. This is a major cause of the cur-
rent dissatisfaction with the modified prudent man rule.
C. Dissatisfaction With the Rule
Behavior which is legally "prudent" is not necessarily in conformity with
the contemporary economic definition of prudence. 9 Recognizing this incon-
sistency between legal and economic standards, one commentator has concluded
that:
From one side of his mouth the chancellor admonishes the trustee to manage
the property as a prudent man would manage his own; from the other side
he warns him and all who deal with him that the law in its wisdom will
not permit prudent management according to twentieth century standards.' 0
In order to fully understand the effect of the reduction in flexibility imposed upon
trustees by the modified prudent man rule which bans investments in speculative
securities, it is necessary to recognize that the purposes underlying trust formation
may differ. Differences in purpose necessarily place upon the trustee different
demands.
Private express trusts may be divided into two general types according to
their underlying purposes."s The first, caretaker trusts, 2 are usually short-term and
designed to protect the interests of particular beneficiaries. The demands of a
caretaker trust are flexibility in its beneficial provisions in order to serve the
needs of the beneficiaries and elaborate safeguards on investment discretion in
order to preserve the safety of the principal and carry out the trust purposes.
Possible gains from a bold investment policy are not worth the risk that the bene-
ficiary's inheritance be dissipated.3 3
The second, dynastic trusts, are usually long-term and established to per-
petuate the estate. 4 The overriding need of a dynastic trust is administrative
flexibility. Rigid rules of investment policy would cripple the trust, for, in order
to survive under changing investment market conditions, it must be able to shift
the investments as the economy changes over the years. 5
By failing to come to grips with the dynastic trust as a distinct trust type,
American jurisprudence has discriminated against the dynastic trust. Applying
rules more appropriate for the regulation of caretaker trusts, the law fails to
provide the flexibility required by dynastic trusts. The reason for this bias
against dynastic trusts is largely historical. The modified prudent man restriction
on powers of trust administrators was developed during a period when the com-
29 See text accompanying notes 40-81 infra.
30 Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627, 658-59 (1962).
31 Friedman, note 3 supra, at 547.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 551.
34 Id. at 547-549. Pension funds and university endowment funds are common examples
of dynastic trusts.
35 Id. at 551.
(February 1975]
mon trust type involved was the caretaker trust. The need for flexible investment
powers was thus minimal.3" As dynastic trusts have grown in importance, the
law has attempted to apply to both long and short trusts rules more appropriate
for regulation of short-term trustsY
If regulations are to permit the flexibility necessary for the effective ad-
ministration of dynastic trusts, there must be a return to the flexible prudent man
rule as it was initially stated in Harvard College. This revival of the rule as
originally stated would provide the flexibility needed for the application of the
appropriate rules for dynastic trusts as outlined by modem capital market
theory. Such a revisionM of the prudent man rule would result in the coincidence
of legal and economic definitions of prudence and would provide trustees with
more realistic and specific guidelines.
III. Economic Approach to Investment Choice: Theory and Application 9
Modem capital market theory seeks to determine the prices of securities
under conditions of uncertainty in a market which is in equilibrium.' It is in
reality a combination of separate theories concerning risk, investor reaction to
risk, and the efficiency of securities markets. The following discussion will
establish the analytical underpinnings of modem capital market theory, derive
implications as to investor behavior, and evaluate its application to the prudent
man rule of trust law.
A. Modern Capital Market Theory
Inherent in the concept of investor prudence is the element of risk. The
prudent man rule is essentially a legal standard regulating the maximum level
of acceptable risk appropriate for a given trust investment; however, it is based
upon an incomplete concept of risk, the risk of capital loss. This concept of risk
assumes that trust beneficiaries are concerned exclusively with capital losses,
rather than with all possible future values of their investments. As such, this
approach ignores the probabilities associated with these other possible values.
Economic risk is concerned not only with the risk of capital loss but also with all
possible future deviations from that which was expected. This uncertain measure
of risk"' is in marked contrast to the legal approach which concentrates exclusively
36 See Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627 (1962).
37 The same rules could hardly apply to both dynastic and caretaker trusts, since they
differ in function and legal needs. See Friedman at 550-51.
38 Undoubtedly revision is needed. In recent years there has been a more scientific study
of investments, yet the results of this study are not reflected in the cases. See ScoTT, note 10
supra, § 227 and text accompanying notes 40-78 infra.
39 Given the long-term nature of a dynastic trust it is particularly well suited to modern
capital market theory. Therefore, the application of modern capital market theory for purposes
of this note will be limited to dynastic trusts.
40 Equilibrium is a state of rest, i.e., the attainment of a position from which there is
neither incentive nor opportunity to move. The equilibrium price is one from which there is
no tendency to move, so long as the underlying supply and demand conditions do not alter.
See also R. LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 358 (1970); G.
STIOLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 93 (3d ed. 1972).
41 The statistical measure of uncertainty risk, standard deviation, measures the width of
the random variables' probability distribution. For the purpose of simplicity this note will
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on capital loss. The narrow legal concept of risk is but a subcategory of the more
general concept of uncertainty risk. Because of this, exclusive concentration on
capital loss can lead to imprudent investment decisions since it is possible that
one portfolio may exhibit greater economic risk than another, even though that
portfolio has a lower probability of capital loss.4 2 By not limiting its inquiry to
capital loss, the economic concept of risk incorporates more available investment
information and, therefore, provides a more complete measure of risk. The
economic concept of risk is thus a more appropriate index of risk because it
considers every possible future deviation.43
In addition to being a more appropriate index of risk, the economic concept
of risk emphasizes the relationship between the risk of an individual security and
the risk of a portfolio." This is a significant contribution since the risk of a port-
folio is not the simple arithmetic mean of the average risk of the individual
securities but rather the covariance' 5 among the individual securities within the
portfolio. In fact, with a large, well-diversified portfolio, the effect of the in-
dependent risk of a security upon the portfolio is likely to be quite small, almost
trivial, relative to the effect of the security's covariance with the portfolio." It is
therefore possible to reduce the risk of the portfolio as a whole by the addition of
a speculative security.4 7
Thus, the owner of a diversified portfolio is shielded against factors operating
to depress the securities of a particular firm or market because such factors usually
tend to improve the earnings of some other firm or market.4 An index of risk
which measures a security's risk without consideration of the effect of that security
upon a portfolio is incomplete and meaningless" because the effect of a single
security's independent risk upon a portfolio is minute. Therefore, the true
economic measure of a security's risk is its contribution to portfolio risk.
Modern capital market theory also recognizes that investment decisionmak-
ing under uncertainty is two-dimensional. The two relevant dimensions axe the
expected return and the degree of risk.50 Every investor faces a trade-off: he will
incur greater amounts of risk only if compensated by increased returns. The in-
assume a normal distribution. This assumption does not detract from the analysis which can
be generalized to nonnormal symmetric stable distributions. See Fama, Portfolio Analysis in a
Stable Paretian Market, 11 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 404-419 (1965).
The use of the term risk for the remainder of this note will be restricted to its economic
connotation, unless otherwise specified.
42 Note, The Regulation of Risky Assets, 83 HAR. L. REv. 603, 619 (1970).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Covariance is the degree to which two variables move together.
46 For a demonstration of this fact see E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE
253-55 (1972).
47 H. MARxowiTz, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENT
112-115 (1959).
48 POSNER at 192. Approximately ninety percent of the independent risk in a portfolio
can be eliminated through diversification by the inclusion of only ten randomly selected stocks.
Therefore, investors can easily obtain a combination of assets that will approximate the market.
See Evans and Archer, Diversification and the Reduction of Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis,
23 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 761 (1968).
49 See E. FAMA & M. MILLER, note 46 supra at 291.
50 See, M. HAMILTON & J. LORIE, STOCK MARKET: THEORY AND EVIDENCE X-3 (Oct.
1972) (unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business) [herein-
after cited as LoRm].
[February 1975]
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vestor does not choose between risk minimization and return maximization but
rather seeks the maximization of return for a given degree of risk.51
In equilibrium, the price of any security will be a function of two com-
ponents.52 The first is a risk-free rate of return.53 The second is a risk premium
which compensates the investor for incurring the risk associated with the return.
Investors, of course, are compensated only for a particular kind of risk-market
risk.54 Independent risk55 can be eliminated through diversification. 5 Since in-
vestors do not have to bear independent risk, they are not compensated for it.
Thus, an investor who wishes to increase his expected return must do so by in-
creasing his exposure to market risk and not to independent risk.57
Then, too, capital assets are priced in an efficient market.5 The prices of
securities in an efficient market fully reflect available information and adjust
quickly and in an unbiased manner to new information.59 "The implication is not
that every stock is correctly valued at every moment in time but that the cost of
finding out whether or not it is correctly valued will usually exceed the profits to
be made from knowing its true value."' The analysis of past price changes and
public information provides no help in achieving increased returns in an ef-
ficient market. Investors can increase their expected return only through risk
manipulation and not by attempting to presage general market movements."'
The concepts of modem capital market theory, uncertainty as a measure of
risk, risk-retum relations, and the efficiency of capital markets will now be used
to derive a modem standard of prudence.
51 Id.
52 See Linter, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REvIEw OF ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); Linter, Secu-
rity Prices, Risk, and Maximal Gains from Diversification, 20 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 587
(1965); Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of
Risk, 19 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 425 (1964). For a clarification of the Sharpe-Linter models see
Fama, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Some Clarifying Comments, 23 JOURNAL OF FINANCE
29 (1968).
53 The return on short-term federal government securities is a good example of a security
with a risk from rate of return.
54 Market risk is that portion of a security's risk which is related to the risk of all other
securities in the capital market. See F. Black, Capital Market Theory: An Introduction, 4(Feb. 1972) (University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Wkg. Paper Ser. No. 24B).
55 Independent risk is the risk that a security will decline in price independently of whether
the market as a whole is rising or falling. See Black id.
56 See LoRm, note 50 supra, XI at 10, 11; W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL
MARKETS 77-103 (1970); E. FAMA AND M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 253-255
(1972).
57 This is accomplished through leverage, use of debt, and not by concentration in riskier
securities. See G. Bigger, Risk-Adjusted Portfolio Performance: Its Investment Implications
32 (1971) (Smith Barney & Co.: Research Development).
58 The term commonly used to describe this situation is that security prices follow a
random walk i.e., the successive price changes are statistically independent. For the evidence
on this fact see Fama, The Behavior of Stock Prices, 38 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 34 (1965);
Granger & Morgenstern, Spectral Analysis of New York Stock Market Prices, 16 KYRLOS 1-27
(1963); c.f. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 35
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 383 (1970).
59 The implication is not that every stock is correctly valued at every moment in time,
but that the cost of finding out whether or not it is correctly valued and the costs of effec-
tuating the transition will usually exceed the profits to be made from knowing its true value.
See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empiriral Work, id.
60 POSNER, note 4 supra, at 193.
61 Costs of search and underdiversification entailed by attempts to "beat" the market will
generally exceed the returns of such activity. See Black, Implications of the Random Walk
Hypothesis for Portfolio Analysis, FINANCIAL .A.NALYST JOURNAL 1 (Mar.-Apr. 1970).
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B. Prudence Under Modern Capital Market Theory
In an efficient market, the expected return on a portfolio will depend more
on the amount of risk incurred than on any secret knowledge or the special
abilities of the portfolio manager.6 2 Therefore, in an efficient market an investor
should follow a passive portfolio strategy."3 The specific requirements of such a
strategy are high diversification, low turnover, risk control, minimization of
management fees, and minimization of taxes.
High diversification is a practical necessity given the fact that investors are
not compensated for bearing independent risk and the only manner in which
independent risk can be eliminated is through diversification. In an efficient
market, attempts to anticipate market movements will be counterproductive
since they will generate needless brokerage expenses and management fees as well
as an unstable risk level. As such, a passive portfolio strategy will eschew such
actions. Finally, the investor with a passive portfolio strategy must also consider
whether any gains or losses should be realized for tax purposes and whether any
realized gain can receive capital gains treatment.14
Modem capital market theory not only suggests this type of passive invest-
ment strategy but also provides the necessary tool for formulating and evaluating
a particular investor's conduct within it. Precise mathematical specifications re-
place vague standards like "prudence" or "reasonableness." 6 5 The availability of
such tools makes investment decisions more precise and rational. This analytical
framework provides the necessary background for a comparison of modem
capital market theory and the prudent man rule.
C. Modern Capital Market Theory and the Prudent Man Rule
The current law of trustee investment powers suffers from the vagueness of
its governing standards. Prudence, according to the Uniform Probate Code,
requires that a trustee shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets
that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another."6
Thus, the prudent man rule has no fixed meaning.
The erroneous legal approach to risk and the failure of the law to dif-
ferentiate between types of trusts has resulted in the misapplication of the prudent
62 See R. BREALEY, SECURITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET 211 (1971). See also,
Ambachtsher, Portfolio Theory and the Security Analyst, FINANCIAL ANALYST JOURNAL 53
(Nov.-Dec. 1972).
63 A passive portfolio strategy implies that an investor should follow a buy-and-hold
strategy, keeping turnover low, and not act on information on specific stocks. This is in con-
trast to an active portfolio strategy in which the investor concentrates his holdings in stocks
he believes will perform well, and exchanges one stock for another whenever he gets new
information. See F. Black, Capital Market Theory: An Introduction, note 54 supra at 3.
64 See LoRiE, note 50 supra, at XIV-15. A logical consequence is the necessity for utilizing
tax loss sales.
65 The mathematical specifications are the correlation and the beta coefficients. The pre-
scription of a beta, measure of market sensitivity, would control the relative risks of the port-
folio and serves as a measure of the trustees' effectiveness to control risk. The prescription of
a correlation coefficient, the degree to which two variables move together, measures the diver-
sification of the portfolio relative to a comprehensive market index. See LoRiE, note 50 supra,
at XV-6 and glossary.
66 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 7-302.
[February 1975]
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man rule. The worst effect of this approach is the judicial concern with the
narrow concept of individual security rather than with portfolio risk: "However
well the portfolio performs, the trustee may be held accountable for the poor
showing of one of his investments in the portfolio if he failed to verify the
soundness of the investment before making it.""7 This narrow focus fosters several
undesirable consequences.
First, trustees are under a duty to investigate the prospects of individual
securities,6" even though in an efficient market the costs of search will generally
exceed the expected benefits. In addition, the trustee is obligated to review
continuously the trust portfolio and dispose of investments originally proper which
have subsequently become improper. 9 The trustee is thus under a duty of
active portfolio management despite the fact that actively managed portfolios
rarely outperform comparable passive portfolios.7" The result is increased man-
agement and transactions costs without any corresponding increase in benefits.
Second, and perhaps most serious, the investment-by-investment application
of the prudent man rule induces the trustee to hold underdiversified portfolios.71
The requirement that a trustee investigate and monitor each security he holds
will limit the number of securities which will be held. A trustee, being limited
in investigative and monitoring capabilities by time and expense, will hold fewer
types of securities as the burden for justifying each security is increased. The
diseconomies of underdiversification are compounded because of the prohibitions
against purchasing speculative securities.7 2 The trustee is precluded from con-
sidering a number of securities which, although risky from an independent
standpoint, may actually lower the risk of the portfolio if included therein. 3 The
result of this underdiversification is the exposure of the trust to large amounts of
uncompensated independent risk.
Third, the present legal approach concentrates exclusively upon only one
aspect of a security, its independent risk, and fails to recognize the existence of
the risk/return trade-off. 4 Rather than viewing the decision as one of minimiz-
ing risk, one should assess the maximum degree of risk that can be tolerated and
67 POSNER, note 4 supra, at 196. See also SCOTT, note 10 supra, § 227.1.
68 See, e.g., In Re Harmon's Estate, 60 Cal. App. 154, 212 Pac. 399 (1923) (loan on
mortgage without investigating the nature of land); Inr Re Cook's Estate, 20 Del. Ch. 123,
171 A. 730 (1934) (purchase on recommendation of broker without independent investigation);
Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N.J. Eq. 617 (1883) (no investigation of real estate).
69 See SCOTT, note 10 supra, § 231. See also State Street Trust Co. v. Walker, 259 Mass.
578, 157 N.E. 334 (1927) (mortgage on depreciating property).
70 As to evidence regarding the inability of active portfolio management to outperform
passive portfolios see M. JENSEN, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS (1972).
The problem is that one is rarely able to gain enough from active portfolio management to
consistently offset his transaction costs.
71 The analysis of mutual fund performance suggests that active portfolio management
will not result in superior results over a comparable portfolio. By analogy one would expect
the same fact to hold true for trustees. See Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the
Period 1945-1964, 23 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 389 (1968); Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance,
39 JOuRNAL OF BUSINESS 119 (1966).
72 PoSNER, note 4 supra, at 196.
73 See text accompanying notes 3-38 supra.
74 See text accompanying notes 39-78 supra.
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select a portfolio that fits this description. 5 By so doing, the investor's return
would be maximized consistent with his preference for risk."
Furthermore, the present legal emphasis upon individual assets leads to
undesirable tax consequences since the taking of capital losses for tax purposes is
discouraged. One court has stated ". . . losses in one investment of trust funds
cannot be set off against other investments of the trust and each investment must
stand or fall by itself."77 A truly prudent investor would plan to use every legal
means necessary to avoid taxes. Yet the law, developed in a century when such
tax problems did not exist, inhibits the trustee from acting prudently as to taxes.
The prudent man rule, because of its evolution, is outdated and inadequate.
The present interpretation is based upon incomplete and erroneous suppositions,
resulting in the rule actually preventing the trustee from acting prudently. The
law must focus on a more rational concept of administrative powers if this
problem is to be solved.
IV. Proposed Remedies
The problem of modernizing trustee investment powers should be ap-
proached in two stages. The first stage concerns the short-term resolution of the
problem through the drafting of appropriate trust provisions which mitigate the
limitations that are imposed by trust law in the absence of such language. The
second stage concerns the long-term resolution of the problem through statutory
reform.
Trustee investment powers can be enlarged by the terms of the trust; how-
ever, the extent of the enlargement is a question of interpretation which the
courts are likely to interpret rather strictly. 9 Trust provisions authorizing a
trustee to make investments "in his discretion" do not extend the trustee's powers
beyond those of a prudent man.80 Courts do not favor attempts to release the
trustee from the general obligation of prudence by means of trust provisions
granting unlimited discretionary investment powers. What is needed, therefore,
is a trust clause which does not remove the obligation of prudence entirely, but
rather defines the standard of prudence to be used in a manner that can be
objectively applied and evaluated.
Such a clause would give the trustee full investment powers by delineating
under the definition of "prudence" desired portfolio management goals: high
diversification, low turnover, risk control, and the minimization of taxes and
management fees. The clause would also allow the trustee to defend any invest-
ment by demonstrating its favorable effect on the portfolio. The clause would
thus incorporate the basic principles of modem capital market theory by redefin-
ing prudence, but it would not do away with the general obligation of prudence.
75 R. BREALY, SEcuRrv PRICES IN A COMPETmvE MARxET 211 (1971).
76 This is due to the fact that risk and return are, on the average, positively related.
77 McKechnie v. City of Springfield, 311 Mass. 406, 414, 41 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1942);
see also Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N.E. 761 (1931).
78 Buek, "Qualified" Trustee Performance, 99 TRusTs AND ESTATES 194 (1960).
79 See SCOTT, note 10 supra, § 227.14.
80 In Re Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N.E. 604 (1903) (broad discretion did not relieve the
trustee from the requirement of the general rule regarding prudence).
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The second stage of this proposed solution would dispose of the problem
through statutory reform. A statute building upon the Uniform Trustees Powers
Act could be used to remedy the current problem of outmoded trustee investment
powers. This statute would have three major sections. First, it would define risk
in terms of uncertainty rather than simply as risk of loss. The standards for hold-
ing an investment undesirable would consequently change from risk of loss to
deviation from rational expectations. Second, the statute would specify precise
standards of prudence corresponding to the basic principles of modem capital
theory. Third, such a statute would shift the law's emphasis away from the risk
of individual securities to the risk of entire portfolios. This would be accom-
plished by allowing the investor to defend any investment by showing that it
affected the portfolio favorably."' Such a statute, by incorporating the basic prin-
ciples of modem capital market theory, would conform trustee investment powers
to twentieth-century economic reality.
V. Conclusion
The economic impact of private trusts is significant and necessitates sub-
stantial revision of the prudent man rule. The trustee of today no longer acts as
caretaker passing blackacre from generation to generation. Instead, he usually
holds a dynastic trust portfolio consisting of various types of securities. He, there-
fore, needs much broader and more flexible investment powers than his historical
counterpart. Failure to recognize the distinction between dynastic and caretaker
trusts has inhibited the development of trustee investment powers to the prej-
udice of the dynastic trust.
The solution to this problem is not the abolition of the prudent man rule
but rather the redefinition of prudence to conform to modem capital market
theory. The basic concepts of modem capital market theory, the uncertainty
measure of risk, the risk-return relation, and the efficiency of capital markets,
imply specific standards of prudence. These standards of prudence, high diversity,
low turnover, minimization of taxes and management fees, and risk control,
would be implemented in a two-step process. To resolve the problem over the
short term, trust clauses should be drafted which implement modem capital
market theory by defining prudence in terms of that theory. The problem cannot
be fully solved, however, until the goals of modem capital market theory become
those of our state legislators.
Joseph V. Rizzi
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